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General Symbols and
General Studies
By

LARRY TYLER

An inherent difficulty in trans-disciplinary general education programs is the lack of a theoretical framework from which to display the
points of unity and convergence between those uniquely human endeavors that, in slavish compliance to custom, are yet discussed as
distinct and separate concerns such as science, art, mysticism, philosophy, and so on. This lack of a general theory makes all attempts at
integration seem strained and artificial. However, clues, hints, and
some significant beginnings toward such a framework do exist in the
work of several writers. A synthesis of those sources seems, perhaps,
in order.
As a point of departure, Suzanne Langer has suggested a "new
key" to intellectual activity: that the frame of reference of an era
is depicted by the questions that it asks and not by the answers it derives. Thus, "the intellectual treatment of any datum ... is determined
by the nature of our questions, and only carried out in the answers."
(Langer, 1961, p. 16)
This relativistic approach implies that reality is unknown and that
interpretations of reality are dictated by interest. At a different level,
this is cogently expressed in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: that language
defines as well as describes reality for its user.
Sapir has written that language "actually defines experience for us
by reason of its formal completeness and because of our unconscious
projection of its implicit expectations into the field of experience ...
Meanings are not so much discovered in experience as imposed upon
it, because of the tyrannical hold that linguistic form has upon our
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orientation in the world." (Sapir, in Hoijer, 1955, p. 93-94)
Though among the first to emphasize language as a determinant of
cultural reality, this view is not unique to Sapir. Much earlier, Durkheim stated much the same thesis:
Thinking consists in arranging our ideas, and consequently
in classifying them . . . But classifying is also naming, for a
general idea has no existence z.nd reality except in and by the
word which expresses it and which alone makes its individuality.
Thus the language of a people always has an influence upon
the manner in which new things, recently learned, are classified
in the mind and are subsequently thought of; these new things
are thus forced to adapt themselves to pre-existing forms. For
this reason the language which men spoke when they undertook
to construct an elaborate representation of the universe marked
the system of ideas which was then born with an indelible trace.
(Durkheim, 1957, pp. 75-76)
Sapir stated categorically "that the 'real world' is to a large extent
unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group ." (Sapir,
in Hoijer, 1955, p. 558) This statement represents the essential core
of thought around which has grown the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis; which in turn is the basis of the theoretical orientations various,.
ly labelled ethnolinguistics, m etalinguistics, psycholinguistics, or exolinguistics. This orientation is elaborated by Whorf in four essays:
"The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language"
( 1939), "Science and Linguistics" ( 1940), "Linguistics as an Exact
Science" ( 1940) , "Language and Logic" ( 1941) .
In "Science and Linguistics," Whorf extends Sapir's position:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and types that we isolate from the world
of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every
observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a
kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by
our minds ... and this means largely by the linguistic systems
in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and
ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to
an agreement to organize it in this way-an agreement that
holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the
patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an
implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decrees.
(Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)
The significance of this dissection of nature by linguistic systems
38

is that each such discussion is valid only to the users of the particular
linguistic system. This is in effect another "principle of relativity."
It decrees that observers with different linguistic backgrounds will,
from the same physical evidence, develop different interpretations
of "reality." Though different, these various interpretations are equally logical. To a great extent, the same principle must apply to the
users of disciplinary jargon and the modern specialists (from ethnomusicologists to aeronautical anthropologists ) whose cant and rhetoric
distinguish them and their world view from the layman who also has
a universe of discourse all his own. The implica tion then is that
science, for example, is simply the interpretation of reality derived by
use of the language of science; and, as a result, has no prior claim
over other interpretations as an approximation of reality.
Language is thus a reifying agent. It is the medium of conceptualizing reality. In his attempt to delinea te a "sociology of knowledge," Karl Mannheim sought the social origins of men's thoughts.
And he wrote that though thought is manifested in the minds of individuals, an emphasis on the individual and his thought will not yield
the needed perspective.
Says M annheim, the individual "thinks in the manner in which his
group thinks. He finds a t his disposal only certain words and their
meanings. These not only determine to a large extent the avenues of
approach to the surrounding world, but they also show a t the same
time from which angle and in which context of activity objects have
hitherto been perceptible and accessible to the group or the indvidual."
(Mannheim, 1936, p. 3)
The relation of la nguage, thought, and reality was long the special
interest of Ernst Cassirer. Language is the realization of man's
propensity to symbolically conceptuali ze his thought and feeling.
Though a highly sophisticated form of symbolic expression, its reliance upon metaphor and analogy in the process of naming m akes
language facilitate non-rational as well as rational thought. It was
this mixture of the rational a nd non-rational in language that led
Cassirer to his consideration of the relation of language to "theories
of knowledge." (Cassirer, 1946 )
It was Cassirer's opinion tha t the "theories of knowledge" ( science
and other forms) overemphasized "facts" and the development of
orderly thought about "facts." This overemphasis of "facts" was accomplished a t the expense of any a ttention being given to the nonra tional or non-tactual aspects of mankind's thought. Non-rational
thought was dismissed, from the study of knowledge, as being either
mysticism or plain ignora nce. In either case, it was not considered
pertinent to the study of knowledge.
Cassirer, however, felt that a theory of "knowledge" should include
a search for the reason behind this sort of "ignorance." While sci39

entists and logicians bemoaned the misconceptions bred by this "ignorance" and by language itself, Cassirer posited a question: Why
should language, an instrument for conveying thought, deter and distort scientific thought?
If language distorts scientific thought, it must do so by giving
preference and support to another form of thought. And since all
thinking deals with phenomena as presented in immediate experience,
there cannot be a way of thinking that is not true to the reports of
the senses. And if language is incompatible with scientific reasoning,
then it must reflect a system of experience that is different from the
accepted mode of experiencing "scientific facts."
Language originated as a form of pre-scientific symbolism. As such,
it, like myth, was developed to give expression to "values," not to
"facts." Language, itself, developed from the process of naming and
making metaphorical allusions to phenomena and experience. Names
and metaphors are the essence of mystical symbols. To name an object
gives you power over it and understanding of it.
Thus language and myth are two modes of thought, born out of
the same evolutionary stage, which developed together as expression
and conception, respectively, of the primitive man's world.
But whereas language, like myth and religion, originated as emotional expression, due to its syntactic structure language avails itself
of reason as well as emotion. Because the units of emotional expression can be linked together to give further meaning, language
facilitates logical thinking, i.e., reason. By the syntax of language the
chasm between the symbolic expression of emotion and the discursive
level of rational thought is bridged. But by the same token, our
language, and ultimately our thought, no matter how disciplined, is
pervaded with non-rational symbolism.
Language utilizes rational and non-rational symbols in the expression of thought and feeling. Science, as an idea system, uses both
mathematical and grammatical language. To the extent that it avails
itself of grammatical language, science contains elements of the nonrational. Some of the distinctions ( and commonalities) between
rational and non-rational symbolization can be represented by the
following illustration.

I.

II.
III.

Scientific Symbolism
(concepts)
Discursive mastery, by
means of rules and procedures, of a world intuitively apprehended.
Expression of facts.
Science.

I.

II.
III.

40

Non-Scientific
Symbolism
Intuitive elaboration of
expenences.

Expression of values.
Art, Myth, Religion.

IV.

IV.

True-false.

Sacred-Profane.
Life-Death.

Dorothy Lee has discussed the reification of symbols in general.
( Lee, 1954) She suggests that the symbol is only one part of a complex field which can be depicted as follows:

0
0

s

S =symbol

=individual

____,!

=thing

- - - - - - - . ) =process

For specific application to science, this is easily adapted to:

0
O

C

C

=individual

=thing

=concept

- - - - - - - - ) =process

The "concept" is then part of a whole or system which includes:
the individual or scientist, the thing ( object in reality), the concept,
and the conceptualizing process. Thus scientific concepts are part of a
process whereby the discursive world is created out of the "real"
world of undifferentiated physical phenomena.
The general system of conceptualization, by which the world of
reality is shaped, is inherent in the use of symbols to derive order and
meaning from experience. The conceptual process structures "things"
out of an infinitely faceted reality. Once conceptualized, the "thing"
and the word-symbol representing it are interdependent upon one another and the other components of the system.
This is evident in scientific, as well as literary and religious, tradi-
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tions. The processual nature of scientific conceptualization is manifested in experimentation and repetition of tests. Only when the
"concept" has been subjected to use or scrutiny in experienced situations does it acquire meaning. Scientific disciplines proceed on this
assumption and systematically increase the meaning ( or reliability) of
their concepts through repeated testing. In the same manner the
symbols of literature acquire specific meaning through repeated
usage within the body of the literary tradition. Likewise, religious
symbols (cross, crescent, Sta r of David, etc.) acquire meaning from
ritualized ceremonial usage within the religious tradition.
The significance of this orientation is that meaning (whether
literary, scientific, or philosophical ) is derived in the various disciplines
via substantively the same conceptual process. The concept gains or
loses meaning through use in concrete situations. Once the situation
is experience, by the scientist or artist or philosopher, through the
utilizing of a concept, then that concept becomes the avenue for
examination of this conceptualized situation. The concept is in process, containing and conveying the situational meaning. It acquires
meaning (becomes reified) by repetitive empirical use. Thus the
seemingly disparate views of reality offered by science and other disciplines are grounded within a common processual method of linguistic
symbolization, m eaning deriva tion, and object reification.
Such an interpretation is posed in the hope that from it, and / or
consequent considerations, a transdisciplinary framework for integrated
general studies might evolve.
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The Small Liberal Arts College:
No Apologies Needed
By

LEONARD

ToMPos

I speak as an idealist to all those vitally concerned with the socalled "liberal arts" colleges. In our practical-minded world, I am
well aware that to declare oneself an idealist is almost tantamount to
declaring oneself irrelevant. Nevertheless, the role of an idealist is an
essential one, even in a world of pragmatists. Often it is the idealist
who formulates the goals pursued by the practical-minded, the idealist
who gives definitive voice to the nebulous values intrinsic to prosaic
pragmatic pursuits. Thus, as an idealist, I wish to reply to the oftheard rhetorical question: "Has the Small College a Future?" ( the
title of an article by Henry Steele Commanger, Saturday R eview,
February 20, 1970) .
The question of the small college's future likely will be determined
by the individual colleges themselves. If they make themselves irrelevant to their students, as well as to society at large, the small college
may at best then hope for a hand-to-mouth ma rginal existence. But
such a situation would, indeed be ironic. The irony would lie in the
fact that the small, so-called liberal arts college seemingly can most
effectively offer not only the type or quality of education most needed
today in our society, but also can provide the optimum educational
settings and conditions.
Our society today, as well as the rest of the world, is desperately in
need of a multitude of persons possessing a true liberal arts education.
Educational writer and researcher Terry Borton (Saturday Review,
April 18, 1970) defined the goal of a liberal education as an "educated
mind---one that combines a sophisticated array of logical and psycho-
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logical processes with personal style and a clear value system."
Borton's definition lacks precision, but does point in the right direction.
From a sociological view point (e.g., C. Wright Mills, The Sociological
I magi nation), one might define someone possessing a liberal arts education as a person who can rather objectively and consistently comprehend the nature of himself and the links between his personal autobiography and the past, present and future. Although possessing
specialized skills and knowledge for making a livelihood in our current world, the liberal arts-educated person would also develop a greater understanding of himself. This knowledge of self as a lifelong
process of self-growth and development must necessarily entail conscious recognition of the human uniqueness of others, the complexities of even the smallest of human relationships, and a quest for at
least some beginning appreciation of Man's multitudinous interrelationships with the life forms and areas which surround him. Stated
concretely, what we need are personnel to staff our basic institutions
who can recognize, appreciate and respect the diverse consequences
of policy decisions at both the formal and personal levels of human
existence, and the consequences of aggregate human behaviors upon
our much-abused planet.
The college which can in some discernible way produce graduates
who have begun to develop such self-qualities may rightfully claim
for itself the title of "liberal arts college." For too long, too many
small colleges have pawned themselves off as citadels of liberal arts
education. In fact, however, they have been aping the mind-stifling
specialization programs of the universities. These colleges have falsely
equated a liberal arts education with taking "survey" and/or "introductory" courses in academic disciplines alien to the student's "major."
I believe with Henry Steele Commager that
Surveys, like outlines, rot the brain. "Culture" cannot be
taught; it is something that the student absorbs from the atmosphere in which he lives--from the tradition of the institutions, from the buildings, and grounds, from well-stocked
libraries, from great teachers, from fellow students, from exposure to the intangibles "at hand." (op. cit.)
Survey courses alone will not produce the "well-rounded" graduate who is the false pride and hollow joy of so many small colleges.
Such formal courses will not give the world what it so desperately
needs: citizens, lawyers and judges who recognize that mere code-book
legality does not always conform to humane considerations of right
and wrong (if in fact there is always a right or wrong side of an issue) ; political winners of statesman-like calibre; research scientists who
recognize the social and political ramifications of their laboratory
work; industrial executives who can see that turning today's fast buck
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may lead to environmental catastrophy for their grandchildren; technically competent school teachers with intellectually guided humane
consideration for their students' individual needs for psycho-emotional
growth; athletic coaches who develop human potential rather than
simply exploit it; artists of all types who can effectively expand the
layman's comprehension not only of himself but also of the social
and natural worlds around him; parents who seek to guide their
children toward emotional freedom rather than to fetter them with
society's statistically normal neuroses; and a multitude of others who
are unafraid to face life as a continuing experience of self-expansion
and socio-cultural change.
Yes, the world today needs an increasingly commonplace "intellectual elite"-if you want to call it that-to replace the collegeprocessed degree-holders whose parochial and base concerns have
held sway for too long.
A big order for small colleges? You bet it is! But it will be the
meeting of that need, the fulfillment of that charge, which will validate the small college's existence. And, if we must sometimes think
in mercenary terms-which we must-the more the small college can
provide the academic setting productive of such graduates as I've
named, the more likely it is to attract lucrative gifts and endowments.
But the small colleges will not be able to get on with this challenge until those who administer them, and those who man the
faculty bastions, are willing to publicly declare themselves in favor
of something. Without a more clearly conceptualized notion of what
a college is really trying to effect in the minds, hearts and souls of its
students, and administrative/faculty commitment to those ends, a college education is a waste of everyone's time and money. Without the
personal commitment of administration, faculty and students to a relatively clear set of liberal arts values and goals, college life then merely duplicates the larger society's processes of self-alienation.
And it is not only the student who suffers the psycho-emotional
stress attendant to such processes! We all become caught up in them,
with faculty and administrator similarly affected. We potentially suffer
the stress from existing in a world of what sometimes is called "putons." In other words, we have learned in large measure not to express what we really feel , not to reveal to others-or to ourselveswhat we really experience as unique individuals existing but briefly
in this world. Rather, we too often have been coached, admonished,
chastised and coerced into believing that the greatest good is to act
and think as we believe others would have us act and think. Thus
we have become the "other directed" people sociologists have noted
since the mid-1950's, and whom the latter-day psychoanalytic crowd
has seen fit to label as the self-alienated, the modern soul woefully out
of communicative touch with himself. We literally "put on" a con-
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tinuing living act of what we believe others expect of us in thought
and action. Doing so, we never really get to explore the inner depths
of our own selves.
It seemingly is a generally felt foregone conclusion that the large
multiversity cannot provide the personalized professor-student intellectual confrontation necessary to their mutual self-growth. Today's
university has too often boasted of its burgeoning student population,
as if population corpulence per se were a desirable state of organizational well-being. The university's size, however, typically has resulted
in bureaucratic immobilization in response to the humane and intellectual needs of its undergraduates.
But this era's young-adult college student is in search of more than
specialized knowledge per se. Very often he also seeks self-knowledge,
or self-hood, as a prerequisite for the more traditional or conventional
forms of intellectual growth. And it is to these ends of genuine human
encounters that the small college seemingly has the greater potential
for succeeding in meeting such student needs.
First, though, the faculty of the small college must be-or become-free of the mind-constricting feelings of irrelevancy and/or
inferiority. It is all too easy for the faculty member of the small college, typically tucked away from the mainstream-or maelstrom-of
American urban life, to develop inappropriate feelings of professional
inadequacy. Such inferiority complexes not only permeate his professional work in his office, lab and/or classroom, but also are displaced
into the personal recesses of his life, into his marriage, and into his
performance as a parent.
Too often this personal malaise transforms itself psychologically
into resentment and anger toward the college itself, as if the college
were a mistress guilty of unrequited love.
As human beings, faculty members must face the fact that they
need, as much as the layman-and the student-, to feel a sense of
personal worth, and especially to feel themselves as professionally adequate persons. This cannot happen, though, when faculty disvalue
not only the type of educational organization in which they practice
their profession, but also negate the very nature and value of their
work activities. If such is the case, the faculty- individually and collectively-suffer the anguish and anger of self-alienation. Then, in
typical clinical fashion, they displace their anger upon the personages
who symbolically comprise the college-its administrators, its deans
and other sundry administrative personnel.
Not all college faculty need condemn themselves professionally
by university criteria which often are irrelevant to the small college
scene. Not all faculty need be faddishly engrossed in the prodigious
proliferation of pretentious professional redundancy. Especially for
faculty at small colleges, they must come to respect their very real
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and vital significance and relevance in creating a personalized academic environment. It is in such environments that students may discover not only themselves, but also what aspects of this complex world
will become pertinent to their lives!
This is not to say that small college faculty members should be
wholly exempt from research, from writing for professional publication, from involvement in regional, national and international professional activities. But there are other kinds of professional practices
which ought to suffice adequately for meeting one's need for professional self-fulfillment. These often are of a n intangible nature, and
thus less likely to come into their just share of publicity and financial
remuneration. These are the actions that enhance the personal dimensions between faculty and students, the fervent presentation of ideas
and questions which burst the restraints of encrusted and/or complacent minds, the bringing out of latent student potentials for manifest human utilization of one's self.
In other words, a faculty member should not feel somehow debased, or ashamed, for devoting his professional growth and development to the personal growth and development of his students.
But it must follow, then, that such efforts not be slighted by administrators ! Rewa rds- honorific and monetary- must be based upon multiple sets of criteria applied appropriately in terms of goals
mutually and clearly agreed upon by all relevantly concerned. Faculties, administrations and students must consciously recognize their
interrelated need for personally meaningful-and thus personally profound-academic action. Only then can effective collective steps be
taken toward achievi ng a sense of genuine humane intellectual encounters on the small college campus.
Aiding the small college towa rd meeting such goals is the very
fact of the college's smallness, and its typical territorial isolation.
Properly utilized , these factors can lend themselves effectively toward
making the student's college education a genuine experience, or "happening." Instead of lamenting one's territorial isolation, take advantage of it. The administration and faculty have a t their disposal
pretty much of a captive audience. Capitalize on this fact.
Turn as much as possible of the college environment into learning
and self-growth experiences. I am not suggesting the development of
Orwelli an-like spectres, nor am I suggesting the depersonalizing processes involved in the "total institution" syndrome of asylums, monasteries, prisons, military academies of old, and the like. Rather, adopt
and adapt the view of your college as an integrated social system, as
a small society with its own distinctive culture. Then try to bring
about an objectively correct sense of consistency among the values
underlying your stated purposes, and the actions taken in the course
of everyday efforts m ade to achieve your goals.
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Try to avoid the schizoid features of the greater American society
at large. Don't profess one set of values congruent with a matched
set of purposes, and then carry on your daily schedules denying the
objective cleavages between ideations and actions. Faculty and administration certainly never have fooled the students as to what the
real action was, or where it was. But I believe faculty and administration too often feared facing openly the disparity between wishes and
is's. Rather than facing the discomfort of reality, they elected to live
in fantasy. Only sometimes under tragic conditions have they been
forced to face realities.
It is difficult to say who suffers more for this, the students or the
faculty. The student often comes to see his own involvement in the
process as that of con-artist. He maintains superficial academic niceties in ultimate exchange for a college-granted union card allowing
entrance into the more prestigious occupational categories. However,
in so coming to view his academic world, the student never can attain a sense of genuine self-achievement measured against a clearly
defined-and relevant-set of standards. Thus he enters the workaday
world fearful of his self-perceived inadequacies, forever feeling inferior
to those who have been graduated from other colleges and universities
where it is believed-often falsely-that others truly have been educated. This kind of a graduate sooner or later comes to feel angry
with alma mater for short-changing him on almost every count. And
then alumni directors and fund-drive personnel wonder why so few
former students cough up so few shekels for the college coffers!
Compare this with the professors' plight. Without commitment to
a common conception of their collective educational tasks, and without a mutually supported concept of the type of gradua te desired, a
faculty member often stands philosophically alone on such mattersor perceives such aloneness which is just as real in its consequences.
This lonely stance is psycho-emotionally uncomfortable, no less so because one has advanced academic degrees. If the administration is
openly unreceptive-or at most quietly sympathetic-to a professor's
ideas in these matters, a sense of alienation, estrangement, m ay develop between the professional self and others, sometimes even between
members of the same department or division. Individually, but in
mass numbers, the faculty may begin to seek psycho-emotional support
from among the students.
This is fraught with danger. Having perhaps been burned by advancing ideas rejected as heretical or mad by his fellow professionals,
the individual faculty member may now be more cautious. Now he
may abdicate his personalized academic stance, and give up those
ideas, values, beliefs for which he fought so futilely. Now he may
espouse the cause celebres as well as the cause ridicules of his students.
He thus may gain not only their transient good will, their fleeting pop-
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ularity, but also their intellectual, emotional and behavioral twinship.
But having won this Pyrrhic victory, where has his professional selfidentity gone? In what ways does he now live up to his internalized
self-definition as someone rightfully apart from the students, as someone in possession of secular scrolls of knowledge and questions to be
passed on to succeeding generations of students? The popularity of
winning twinship with the students is ephemeral at best, and at worst
ultimately catastrophic to the individual professor's sense of self-respect
and worth. Also, these occurrences contribute to the students' collective sense of a lack of firm, fair and humane guidance in their own
intellectual and emotional self-growth.
Such may be some of the psychic costs extracted from students and
faculty when their college environment is too pervasively characterized
by cultural schizophrenia.
The small liberal arts college is at an advantage in avoiding such
organizational and personal tragedy. Its size allows personalized
contact between all of its participating members. So long as these
contacts allow healthy respect for individual differences, they are a
positive factor. When such mutual self-knowledge degenerates into
personal animosities, when personal enmities take precedence over the
collective good, then they may well become dysfunctional to the college and the individuals who make it a viable social organization.
Effectively administered, the small liberal arts college should be
better able than the cumbersome multiversity to coordinate its activities in support of its values and goals. Direct personal contacts between college personnel at all levels of organization should be utilized
to facilitate concreted action, rather than to engage in petty personality disputes.
Traditional programs and activities should be re-evaluated in terms
of newly-explicit college values and goals, and in terms of what kind
of student one wants to "turn out" as a graduate. Homecomings,
vestigal remnants of bygone eras now so quickly made historical, might
very well be the time to stage an appropriate and timely academic/cultural conference. The traditional football game thus could provide the
necessary gladitorial spectator relief from a weekend's concentrated
total academic learning experience. Currently enrolled students may
well work their meetings with alumni into the conference reception
schedules; alumni could more readily re-identify themselves with
something of real academic substance; and parents of students could
be duly impressed with the intellectual stimulation confronting their
children. (Such a display of academic depth and substance may
even make the parents more willing to keep paying higher tuition rates,
and may dispose more alumni to give more dollars to the college.)
Further efforts ought to be directed toward making a continuing
link between the students' campus learning experiences and their
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parents' knowledge thereof. Instead of the traditional Parents' Day
hoopla of trivia, what about a Parents' Live-In during the week when
the real life of academe is in process? A few of the parents may even
become cerebrally reactivated. Parent and child may then have something of significance to discuss with one another during holidays which
for many students and parents now are simply times of awkward
periods of silence broken occasionally by sullen and angry words.
Maybe such campus inter-generational "happenings" could in some
small way reduce the so-called "generation gap" experienced acutely
by so many college students and their parents.
Also, what about parents' being invited to participate for even
simply honorific credit in curriculum specials, such as interim programs, summer field expeditions, etc.? Such "total family participation" in the students' education may help establish academically profound traditions, and increase student/alumni identification with the
college. ( And, again, if one is prone to be mercenary, alumni strongly
identifying themselves with the college through continuing participation in such programs will be more positively disposed to put cash on
the barrelhead for college development.)
The "problems" stemming from such programs might include the
psychological threat to an insecure professor having to "prove" his
academic self in a classroom of students and their parents, and the
threat to the student's self-growth by the potential real and/or
imagined controls of a nearby parent on campus. However, the avoidance of these problems and others will not strengthen a small liberal
arts college nor assist its students toward greater maturity. Conversely,
the development of programs which successfully deal with such problems will strengthen immensely the college's overall curriculum, and
will greatly assist the college in facilitating the student's intellectual
and emotional growth.
In re-evaluating traditional practices, summer orientation programs should not be neglected. Mom and Dad ought to be warned
that the college may alter their child in some very significant ways.
Parents ought to be told, and they have a right to know, what the
college is going to attempt to do with their children's minds. It is
especially at this point that it becomes necessary for the college to have
made up its mind about what kind or kinds of graduates it wants to
mold, produce, create, or call it what you will. Whether or not the
college has a coordinated program to produce a certain kind of human
product, it is still going to have a profound impact upon those who attend it for several years!
The college should be able to clearly say what it hopes to do with
an incoming freshman, and how it plans to go about doing it. Anything short of that and the parents are simply being conned into buying a pig in a poke. And at today's tuition rates, many parents balk
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at such an offer. Thus, the college that can do such will be better able
to compete and survive healthily in the academic marketplace, and
will better serve its students and society at large.
Incoming freshmen ought to be challenged intellectually immediately. Will they accept the mental agonies of having some already
crustaceous concepts shaken loose, and of stretching and strengthening
their potential for further intellectual and self growth? Will they
give up the pseudo-inner calm of certain foreclosed thought systems
to acquire a set of self-learning techniques that lastingly guard against
the false security of mental closure? Will they dare explore the depths
of their own selves as they probe the recesss of acadmic unknowns,
forever asking, "What more can this tell me about myself?"
It may well be that the student's greatest learning achievement will
lie in acquiring the ability to ask relevant questions, questions that get
to the nitty-gritty of ever-increasing rates of social change, questions
that link up the individual's autobiography with the socio-historical
processes swirling about him, questions that make relevant one's college experiences and classroom-gained knowledge. If the student is not
willing to engage himself, to commit himself, to the college as a learning process, not simply a "thing" to attend, then he ought not dare
to attend the kind of college implicit in my discussion. The student
ought to be made to realize clearly, from the beginning of his college
career, that one cannot passively absorb a relevant education! The
academic setting may be correctly structured, the professors may be
receptive to student questions and ideas, but the student himself must
take the initiative to make his stay on campus a relevant education!
But you don't create these kinds of impressions in the minds of
your freshmen when traditional Autumn hazing makes the frosh out
to be something contemptible--even if merely in jest. We can no longer afford the luxury of college life being a jesting matter. Neither can
we afford to affront the dignity of intellectually sophisticated freshmen.
The freshman is a treasured asset! The college probably has spent
much money to lure him onto campus. Treat him with respect, and
command his mutual respect by confronting him first with your best
and most eloquent faculty and administrative minds. 111e necessary
festive respites from the academic grind will take care of themselves,
for both students and professional staff. Somehow Man's archtypical
proclivity for festivity always seems to take care of that matter.
And, so, what have I said? From my idealist's perspective, I see
the small liberal arts college as an absolute necessity for today's world.
Such a college's size allows it-but not automatically-to develop the
organizational structural setting and curriculum versatility to meet the
needs not only of the students who attend, but also-in the long runthe needs of the world society.
I also see a special kind of student emerging from such colleges, a
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student not only competently trained, but also educated beyond being
a repository of information already outmoded as he receives his diploma. I see a student educated to see himself linked with the past, related meaningfully to the socio-historical processes so rapidly altering
the world in which he lives, and capable of raising the kinds of questions that keep his mind current and relatively clear in the onrush of
social change. I see the small liberal arts college containing the
potential for nurturing, developing and graduating the kinds of individuals whose collective impact on the world will be for mankind's
humane betterment.
I see small colleges unashamed of their miniscule size compared
to that of the multiversity. I see their faculty members deriving self
and professional satisfactions from personally engaging their students'
minds, and from seeing their students develop their own professional
competency and individual self integrity. I envision small colleges
becoming inter-generational, involving parents and alumni in mean·
ingful academic happenings.
The realist part of me sees great difficulties of all kinds in achieving
such goals, even in limited scale. But if all these things wholly fail to
come to be, then we shall all be the poorer for it.
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1. Hegel and Youth

The philosopher and educator Georg W. Hegel ( 1770-1831) and
the academic youth of the last five generations in West and Eastyouthful rebels and counter-rebels, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries-are separate from each other as well as inseparable. During
the last one and a half centuries, since Hegel reached the culmination
of his career in Berlin, even wider distances of time and space
separated one generation of students after the other from the great
philosopher and educator. But that separation was merely external.
In spirit the academic youth remained inseparable from Hegel, from
his last years at the University of Berlin, throughout the further development of the philosophical university of the 19th century and the
evolution of the positive university of the 20th century up to the
present. Hegel cannot be understood without his many contacts and
relationships with students in Berlin, throughout Germany and Europe
during his lifetime, and his enormous philosophical, pedagogical and
political influence upon the academic youth of the world beyond his
grave. This same academic youth of the philosophical and positive
universities, on the other hand, remains unintelligible in its philosophical theories and political practice, its hopes, aspiratons and sufferngs
without Hegel's genius and his philosophical, educational and political
work. This academic youth has not only negated Hegel by its criticism
as well as by its ignorance, it has also preserved and elevated him in
its philosophies and educational as well as political projects.
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Hegel's philosophical life-work, his Phenomenology of the Spirit,
Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Right, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Art, Philosophy of Religion, History of Philosophy-is general education, general studies at its peak in Western civilization.
The one universal goal of Hegel's philosophical and educational lifework was the liberation of youth toward an existence of reason and
freedom-a non-fragmented, non-compartmentalized, real and authentic life. For Hegel, a truly human existence in reason and freedom
meant man's achievement of the identity of his identity and non-identity, the wholly "other"-nature, history and the utimate reality of the
Logos as the divine totality of Being. This universal motif of Hegel's
philosophical and educational life-work-liberation toward an existence in reason and freedom-stimulated and gave direction directly
to the rebellion and indirectly to the counter-rebellion of academic
youth in "civil society" during the last 150 years up to the present
student-protest-movement and the countervailing forces it elicited.
Throughout his career as philosopher and educator Hegel thought
to achieve his goal of liberating youth toward a free and rational existence by preventing young men in and outside of the philosophical
university from running away from history and by preparing and
hardening them for facing up to it. Hegel knew himself as a man who
lives in a late phase of the modern world, in the womb of which a postmodern epoch of human evolution is stirring. He finds himself in the
midst of the senescence process of the extremely particularized European civilization. Europe is finished in principle, no matter how long
it may prevail in a niche of the social evolution of mankind. According to Hegel's historical perspective either America or Russia will become the next world historical nation. Hegel feels like an autumn man.
Winter was corning for Europe. Before winter sets in, Hegel wants to
bring home the harvest of the gigantic process of world history up to
his time in order to prepare a postmodern world historical stage of
more universal reason and freedom (both theoretical and practical).
In world history the spirit, hard and prosaic, comes to himself-the divine Logos as well as man. World history is a huge Golgotha for
Hegel. It is tragic but not absurd . It is not a mass-neurosis but a hard
educational process toward the ultimate goal, not of the Prussian or
the Napoleonic state, but of a divine-human realm of freedom. Hegel
did not betray the future. If he had done so, he could not possibly
have fascinated the rebellious and revolutionary youth of the following
one and a half centuries.
For Hegel, learning to think history means learning to die. It
means to take upon oneself solitude and loneliness. It means to give
oneself unconditionally into the sacrificial process which is world history in which, according to Hegel's extremely theistic view, the real
God sacrifices himself. It means to participate in the death of God.
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In the preface of his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel writes: "But not
the life that shys away from death and which keeps itself clean from
devastation, but which endures it and in it preserves itself, is the life
of the spirit." Man gains his truth, his freedom, only by finding himself, through being absolutely rendered asunder. Hegel was the great
anti-romantic. He resisted every trace of romantic primitivism in his
students. In Hegel's view, youth had to learn to face the fury of disappearance at work in history. Youth will find its identity only in being rendered apart, only if it looks the terrible power of negation,
active in history, straight in its face and abides with it. Hegel did not
want to harmonize for his students what could not be harmonized.
He was not an ideologist justifying to his students the contradictions
of the societal process in which they lived. History is certainly continual rejuvenation and elevation, but it is also negation. Only a youth
who can face the negative in history will be able to liberate itself and
others toward the ultimate realm of freedom. That is the philosopher
and educator Hegel's testament to his students and the youth of the
world: Freedom through liberation and liberation through facing the
negativity of the world historical process. One must understand that
testament in order to grasp the relation between Hegel and the rebellion and counter-rebellion of youth in the last 150 years.

2. Berlin: the Culmination
On December 26, 1817 Baron von Altenstein, the first "Minister of
Religion and Education" in the state of Prussia, respectfully offered to
the already famous philosopher Hegel a professorship at the University
of Berlin. At the time of the offer Hegel taught aesthetics, anthropology, psychology and history of philosophy as full professor of philosophy
at the University of Heidelberg. Hegel accepted his new teaching assignment at the University of Berlin with enthusiasm and the highest
expectations. Minister Altenstein's offer was the most extraordinary
one Hegel had ever received so far in his otherwise rather uneventful
life. In Berlin the theological university had died. The positive university had not yet been born. Here in Berlin the philosophical university would reach its highest peak and Hegel would become one
of its outstanding representatives.
At the time of his call to Berlin, Hegel was 47 years old. He had
been a teacher of youth throughout his life. After his seminary years
in Tiibingen he had been a private tutor in Bern and Frankfurt,
privatdocent and professor of philosophy at the University of Jena,
headmaster of the humanistic Gymnasium in Niirnberg and during
the last two years professor at Heidelberg. He had come to know
the German and European Youth of the period of the Great Revolution in France and the Napoleonic era like few other men of his time.
Now in the summer of 1818, he taught his fourth and last semester
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in Heidelberg and then left the romantic town on the banks of the
Neckar for the much more sober and prosaic Berlin. Arriving in the
Prussian capital, Professor Hegel moved with his family-his wife
Marie (21 years younger than he) and his three still small sons-Ludwig, Karl and Emmanuel-into a house on the corner of the busy
Leipziger and Friedrich Strasse, which Minister Altenstein's sister had
found for him. La ter, Hegel's family settled permanently in the house
where Hegel was to live and work as philosopher and educator until
his death from a stomach ailment on November 4, 1831. The address
of the house was "Am Kupfergraben, Nummer 4." It was from this
house that Hegel's strongest philosophical and political impulses radiated throughout Berlin, Germany and Europe. Here he reached the
culmination of his career as the Heraclitus, Plato or Aristotle of the
19th century-as philosopher, teacher, author, politician.
To the Hegel house "Am Kupfergarben" came students from Berlin, from all over Germany, and finally from all corners of Europe.
The house was always open for students. Hegel always had time for
his students despite his h ard ground-breaking work in philosophy and
his many engagements in the administration of the university, p articularly as its president. The wine from the Rhine, the Mosel a nd
Bordeaux flowed plentifully during serious encounters as well as during many happy bull-sessions. But with his new Prussian professor's
salary of 2000 thalers a year he could now afford some luxuries in life,
after he h ad lived close to the poverty line for thirty intellectually
highly productive years. Finally the truth-value of H egel's philosophy
turned into exchange-value for him in German civil society. H egel
enjoyed the newly gained luxuries and let his students participate in
them. A real H egel-cult developed around the house " Am Kupfergraben" in Berlin, and finally throughout Germany and Europe.
H egel was certainly the most serious of all the serious philosophers
Europe has ever produced. His extremely theistic system of world history, including the history of social ethics, art, religion and philosophy,
was gigantic and full of compelling genial insights and there was
nothing to laugh a t or about. For Hegel, history was a slaughterhouse. The historical present was for him always a "cross" and only
in this "cross" could m an enjoy the "rose" of reason and freedom.
With super-human energy, H egel forced together the cultural and
social opposites of his time into a grandiose synthesis; and if he ever
suffered from schizophrenia, he certainly m ade the best of it. But
this synthesis did not come easy to him. It was painful and his rather
slow, heavy and fl agging lecturing gave witness to that. H egel had his
own share of personal sufferings: his earlier poverty, his mentally sick
sister, the devia tions of his na tural son Ludwig. H egel carried his
suffering deep inside as a sturdy Lutheran, which h e again and again
confessed to be. Hegel as an older man spoke a lot of "discipline" to
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his students, particularly in his lectures on the philosophy of right, the
very substance of which was freedom. Hegel aged early.
But Hegel also knew that life and history were, at least on the surface, not all that serious, but rather a bacchantian ecstasy in which all
are drunk. The world was to him a dionysian madhouse. Hegel loved
the old Greeks and he was grateful to them for giving not only Apollo,
but also Dionysos to later Western civilization. Hegel enjoyed life as
much as it was possible under the rather repressive conditions of the
Restoration-Germany after the French Revolution. He had joy from
his family, his teaching, his students, his travels, his snuff and drinking, the lottery and last but not least from the young actresses of the
Berlin opera. Hegel often relaxed his students by his rustic humor.
At one time he proved the presence of dialectical logic in nature by the
fact that it ironically locates extremes closely together: for instance
in all higher organisms the highest function of procreation with the
lowest function of defecation. Hegel could laugh himself to death
reading Aristophanes. During a lecture on aesthetics he told his students that nobody could really know how "piggish well" a man could
feel without having read the plays of Aristophanes.
More than about "discipline" Hegel spoke to his students about
"enjoyment." For the great dialectician, discipline and enjoyment
were not only opposites. They belong together. They reproduce each
other. Hegel spent not only hundreds of class hours on his very serious and highly disciplined philosophy of right, religion and history, but
also on his aesthetics, which contains a strong tendency toward what
we would call today "non-repressive de-sublimation." "Am Kupfergraben" in Berlin was a serious but at the same time, happy home for
the Hegel family as well as for many of Hegel's students. Hegel was
one of the first European philosophers who got married at all and
established a rather happy and harmonious home.
3. Philosophioal Theory and Political Practice
On October 22, 1818 Hegel gave his inaugural speech at the University of Berlin. In this speech, Hegel described the correlation between philosophical theory and political practice against the dramatic
background of his time. When Hegel began his teaching activity in
the Berlin University, the beheaded body of Marie Antoinette, the
former radiant Archduchess of Austria, wife of the dull Louis XVI
and queen of France, lay in a common grave in Paris. Both the great
French Revolution and Napoleon had run their course. Hegel commented that people believe something only after it is repeated. The
citoyen revolution was settled once and for all by the arch conservative
Austrian foreign minister and later chancellor Metternich. The furious national liberation wars against Napoleon had ended and Metternich's restoration began to flourish fully. In the French Parliament
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the political party-names "The Right" and "The Left" came up for
the first time, never to be forgotten again . The American Republic
had established itself well among the powers of the earth by an anticolonialistic citoyen-revolution. Hegel gave the American Revolution
his full "world historical" endorsement.
H egel's students had lived through these world historical events
a nd had experienced some of them immediately and personally. "At
this point in time," Hegel lectured, "those circumstances seem to obtain which augur the return of attention to and love of philosophy,
so that this discipline, which almost completely lost its voice, may begin to speak again. For, a short time ago, it was in part the then current exigencies which gave the minor interests of everyday life such a
great power over us, and it was in part the lofty interests of reality, the
interests in the struggle to consolidate and preserve the political unity
of national life and the state, a struggle, which so absorbed all the
energy of the intellect and the strength of all ranks of society as well
as all outer sources, that the inner life of the mind could not find any
respite. The world spirit so occupied with reality, so engrossed by
external things, was prevented from turning inward and concentrating on himself, and from endulging and enjoying himself in its own
home territory. Well, after this torrent of reality had stopped and the
German nation had rescued its nationality-the foundation of all living life, the time began, in which, with the state, next to the governing of the real world, the free realm of thought blossomed independently.... And particularly this state, which welcomed me, elevated itself
by means of intellectual advantage to its authority in the real world
and in politics, reaching the same level of power and independence
as those states whose external resources were superior. Here education
in and the flourishing of science and scholarship are cardinal forces
in politics."
H egel's whole heart was with education, science, scholarship,
philosophy. But he was only too aware of the dialectics of philosophical theory and political practice. "However," Hegel continued, "intellectual life is not the only fundamental force in the existence of this
state: now more particularly, we are witnessing the sublime beginning
of the great struggle of the people and its rulers for independence, for
the overthrow of unfeeling foreign tyrants, and for freedom of mind,
heart and soul. The ethical power of the intellect felt its own energy,
raised its banner and asserted this feeling as the might and power of
reality. We must regard as inestimable the fact that our generation
has lived, acted and produced in the grip of this feeling, in which all
law, morals and religion are connected. In such deep and universal
endeavor, the intellect inwardly raises itself to its dignity, while the
shallowness of life and the insipidity of interests perish, and the superficiality of judgment and opinion is exposed and vanishes. The pro-
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founder earnestness which has entered the mind, heart and soul is the
real basis for philosophy." For Berlin's new philosopher, inner philosophical theory and external political practice were separate. But
there existed no stiff dualism between them. They were fundamentally
inseparable. They flowed into each other. They are fully alive only
in each other. Philosophical theory and political practice condition
and reproduce each other mutually and weave and work in each other
toward the realm of concrete social freedom-the "telos" of all world
history.
It was particularly during his Berlin years, after his inaugural address on philosophical theory and political practice, that Hegel became
the one philosopher who, through his rebellious as well as counterrebellious, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary students and more
distant disciples, would effectively change the political face of the
earth by philosophical theory. One does not overcome Hegel by
underestimating theory in a condescending way. The old Chinese
knew it already: in his head the fish stinks first! When man begins
to think, his world changes. Hegel not only interpreted the world, but
also changed it. Ernst Cassirer is correct in his remark, that no other
philosophical system has ever exerted such strong and enduring influence on the political life of the next generations as the metaphysics of Hegel. The more or less angry young men of the generations following the climax of Hegel's career in Berlin have not yet produced a single political system or movement that would have resisted successfully the great philosopher's impact. Where would H.
Marcuse, philosopher of the New Left, or Norman 0. Brown, visionary of the New Right be without Hegel's still powerful philosophical
and political influence?
Hegel came to Berlin and lived and worked there for 13 years not
only with philosophical, but also with political ambitions. Already
early in his career he had rewritten the constitution of his home-state
of Wi.irttemberg. Still shortly before his death, he finished a critique
of an English reform-bill, which the Prussian government repressed
for some time in order not to let it disturb its good relations with
Great Britain. There was the stuff of a great politician in the philosopher Hegel, which the rather oppressive reality of German civil society
in a period of restoration denied its full actualization. Hegel came,
nevertheless, close to the image of Plato's philosopher-king, at least
via the work of his students and disciples. With Hegel, schoolphilosophy began to climb down from its academic cathedra in the
philosophical university into the political arena, causing enormous rebellions and counter-rebellions throughout the 19th century and gigantic revolutions and counter-revolutions in the 20th century.
Naturally we have no sufficient evidence and therefore no right to
assume that every single rebellion or counter-rebellion, revolution or
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counter-revolution in modern societies of the last 140 years in West or
East can be traced back directly or indirectly to Hegel or H egelians.
Not every revolutionary betrays his Hegelian background so well as,
for instance M ao Tse Tung, when he speaks of world history as a
"long march from animality to freedom." Also, H egel must not be
blamed for every transformation his philosophy suffered under the
hands of 5 generations of revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries.
A teacher should never be blamed for all the mistakes of his students.
Also the effects of all original causes in the course of world history
are the more mitigated in time by later causes, the more the timedistance grows between the original cause and its later effects. That is
particularly true for the influence Hegel had upon the rebellious and
counter-rebellious, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary youth of
the 19th and 20th centuries.
But it also cannot be entirely denied--on the basis of evidence
which actually exists-that most rebellions and counter-rebellions,
revolutions of the past five generations a re somewhat connected with
Hegel's philosophy, be it with its radical dialectical form or its more
conservative content. They were imitations of it or deviations from it
or contradictions against it. Since, with few exceptions, by H egel's
time the kings had still not yet become philosophers, philosophy
entered the dimension of political practice. This meant that in terms
of Hegel's Philosoph y of Right the existential social life-world would
become rational and thereby real and that the rational would become
existential in man's social life-world and thereby real. Youth became
impatient during H egel's lifetime and no longer wanted to endure
the fact that their political life-world would remain irrational and unfree and that reason and freedom would remain non-existent in their
political world. They found their intellectual leadership in Hegel and
among the Hegelians.
In Berlin Hegel laid the theoretical founda tion for the practical
execution of reason and freedom in the political life-world by the
youth of the following generations in West and East. The drama of
the political actualization of reason and freedom is still going on in
1971 and will probably continue, even if the recent student protest
movement should become a matter of the past. Wherever this drama
unfolds, the counter-drama will soon arise. Where there is an "SDS"
group on campus, there will soon come into existence a group of "The
Young Americans for Freedom." That is the dialectic of freedom.
Hegel is often blamed for this dialectic of freedom in modern societies.
This is one reason Hegel's work is still difficult to discuss in "civil" as
well as in socialistic society. Each of them has its own set of Hegellegends. These, by the way, are the best witness to Hegel's enormous
influence, which their content may at the same time deny. For "civil
society," Hegel is the man who, allegedly, destroyed liberalism and
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became the intellectual father of Feuerbach, Marx, Bakunin, Lenin,
Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and even Stalin and of everything these
"Hegelians on the Left" stand for. For the socialistic society, Hegel is,
allegedly, the arch-ideologist of the Western bourgeoise, the great
mystifier of the world historical process and even the father of European fascism and of everything that "Hegelians on the Right" stand
for, and so the more dangerous and fearsome, the greater his philosophical genius.
Hegel is obviously deeply involved in the dialectics of freedom in
the 19th and 20th centuries. Civil society and socialistic society must
talk about Hegel. It does not help either of them to repress Hegel's
memory. If they do so, the philosophical giant will continually attack
their rear in unwatched moments. His philosophical influence will not
be conquered by repression. Modern society owes it to itself and more
still to its restless younger generation to discuss Hegel and his relation
to modem rebellions and counter-rebellions, be it only for the simple
purpose of self-clarification in the present crisis situation. The understanding of Hegel and his work and influence may be greatly helped
by studying the way in which he handled the rebellion and counterrebellion of youth at his time. It will become obvious in such study,
that Hegel's time is not completely different from ours and that at
least some of his problems are still our problems and that there is a
chance that some of his solutions could still become our solutions.

4. Hope and Desperation
When Hegel gave his inaugural speech in October 1818, he knew
the youth around himself in Berlin, Giessen, Jena and all over
Germany was struggling between political hope and desperation. Even
on December 13, 1830, a year before his death, Hegel writes to his
friend Gosche!, that at present the gigantic political interest has swallowed up all other interests. Throughout Hegel's teaching activity in
Berlin the political situation in Germany and Europe remained turbulent. Philosophical theory and political practice had entered into a
dialectical correlation never to be discontinued again up to the present.
In the second and third decade of the 19th century, the restless
German youth marched around on the streets of Berlin and other
German cities, with new hopes, new aspirations, new banners and new
songs. But the great hopes of those young men marching in the streets
were again and again deeply disappointed. Their friends had been
imprisoned and even shot by the police during and after the riot of
1816. Student rebellions and counter-rebellions would follow in 1819,
1820, 1822, up to the abortive German citoyen-revolution of 1848.
This youth had to experience the hard way that the master-servant
relationship, which Hegel had described in his Phenomenology of the
Spirit, was brutal reality and that the masters did not take jokes. The
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order of domination in which the students lived was real. Political
practice showed that better than philosophical theory. The bloody
heads of the students demonstrated it. This youth had great hopes and
was at the same time desperate. It was torn between hope and
desperation.
The youth whom H egel could observe around himself suffered
from a high degree of psychic instability. Students were extremely
irritated. Some youth-groups became politically perverted. They
searched for short circuit outlets for their frustration, d esperation, and
general inner misery in pogroms and political murder. Contemporary
attentive foreign observers from the East see in German youth an explosive power which could possibly blow up the whole of Europe.
Hegel teaches a youth which has in itself the propensity and inclination to throw away, in its utter despera tion, the highest divine
gift, the gift of reason, which enables man to take freely and joyfully
responsibility in and for society. This youth becomes aggressive toward
the outside, against others, strangers- for instance against Frenchmen,
Poles, Jews-since it is lacking in healthy self-confidence. The aggressions which had been ineffective in changing the obsolete unjust old
social order of Germany would turn outside and produce international
problems of the largest scope. H egel is the philosopher and teacher of
youth which, despite some residue of hope and trust, has fundamentally lost its faith and hope that the miserable social conditions of its
country could ever be changed toward the establishment of a rational
and free society. This youth H egel wants to bring to reason. Passionately he puts his whole existence into that task. H e is not willing to
capitulate to desperation . H e is a man of hope in the midst of historical disaster. He is not a rebel or counter-rebel, not a revolutionary or
counter-revolutionary. H e is a progressive evolutionist. H e teaches at
the same time an ethos of adaptation to and of resistance against the
unjust power structures of semi-feudal German civil society.
The youth around H egel in Berlin and all over Germany and
Europe can be divided into four groups: the conformists, the rebels,
the counter-rebels, and the evolutionists. Each of those four groups
developed its own specific attitude toward the societal process in which
they all participated. The philosopher a nd educator H egel is related
to all four of those groups, but in very different ways.

5. The Conformists
The conformist group of German youth is concerned with adaptation for survival alone. Survival is its highest ethical and socioethical
imperative. The m embers of this group prefer nothing more than to
fit-under all circumstances-into the extant German and European
social system with its specific power structure and order of domination-no matter how unjust or repressive it may be or how many con-
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tradictions it may contain. In the perspective of this conformist youth,
the great revolution of the "others" across the Rhine had miserably
failed. Now, after the long years of revolutionary disorganization
through Europe and Germany, nothing is needed more than reorganization, stabilization, harmonization, return to the old equilibrium. The
young foxes to whom the grapes of reason and freedom have become
too sour adapt themselves cunningly to the old order to survive. They
become traditionalists. Later they would find an ideological home in
the "Hegelian Center."
Did Hegel have something to do with the traditionalistic conformists? On the 10th of June 1822, the very powerful, important and
prudent Minister Altenstein wrote to the Prussian State Chancellor
Hardenberg, that Hegel was the most profound and genuine philosopher Germany had. Altenstein himself became a Hegelian later on.
He emphasized to Hardenberg that even greater than Hegel's value as
a philosopher was his value as a man and a university teacher. He
praised Hegel for having an infinitely beneficent effect upon the youth.
In what did this beneficent effect consist? According to Minister Altenstein, Hegel had "broken the conceit and arrogance of the young
people." This is, of course, a very questionable and doubtful kind of
praise for any pedagogue by the representative of any establishment.
Did Hegel's philosophical genius break the courage of the youth to
analyze and to change by political action the oppressive social conditions around them in the still semi-feudal civil society of Germany and
other European countries? Did Hegel produce conformists whose intellectual backbone had been broken? Did he preach resignation to an
unbearable social and political situation?
Minister Altenstein's praise throws light on the most problematic
aspect of Hegel's work as philosopher and pedagogue. Hegel wanted
to promote the selfness of his students by breaking their selfishness. He
wanted to help the birth of free subjectivity in his students by conquering bad egotistic subjectivity. For Hegel, bad subjectivity was one unmediated by historical reality. It was romantic subjectivity-the beautiful soul without contact with the real facts of social and political life.
Such subjectivity was abstract and therefore untrue. Hegel wanted to
educate his students to a concrete free subjectivity, one mediated with
itself through facing and changing political and historical reality.
Where "id" is, "ego" must be. The God Logos had to prevail. Spirit
was all. The selfish, irrational, arbitrary subjective freedom has to be
broken in the educational process, so that the real concrete freedomthe unity of the youthful subject and its objective political and historical world-can be actualized. In Freudian terms: Hegel without
underestimating the importance of the pleasure principle, wants to
educate a youth which would be able to face and endure the political
and historical reality principle. To break selfishness in order to reach
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true selfhood-that is the most crucial, the almost impossible task of
an educator. Hegel failed many times in that task with himself, with
his students, and last but not least in the upbringing of his illegitimate
son Ludwig. But there is no evidence that Hegel in trying to fulfill
that task produced conformists en masse. Ludwig became a rebel. In
fact, Hegel showed little interest in the conformist youth around him.
They had their reward .
In the worldwide struggle between the Hegelian Left- representing
the interests of the proletariat in civil society-and the Hegelian Right
-standing up for the interests of the petite-bourgeoisie and the high
bourgeoisie throughout the 19th and 20th centuries-the Hegelian
Center ( conformists and traditionalists) often attempted to remain
neutral. But because the biological law of inertia dominates the processes of civil society, the neutrality of the conformists and traditionalists turned mostly into support of the reactionary Right. It needs no
particular effort to let a society regress down hill. It needs active
political engagement to transform civil society into a rational and free
society. Conformists and traditionalists were not willing to become engaged agents of change. Only too often they became the material,
objects, gunfodder, victims for the far Right agents of regressive
change. Left and Right want social change-the Right toward the
good old times, an earlier period of social evolution of the human
species and the Left toward an evolutionary period mankind has never
gone through before. Only too often, the traditionalist and conformist
Hegelian Center, by professing ideological neutrality and value-freedom, latently promoted not the progressive social dynamics of the Left
but the regressive social kinetics of the Right.
6. The Rebels
Shortly before his death, Hegel sees a flash of lightning at the
political-historical horizon: the rise of youthful rebels of the highest
intellectual abilities, who would devote themselves to political radicalization on the far Left of the political-ideological spectrum of civil
society. Soon those rebels would close themselves together to form and
constitute the radical Hegelian Left in Berlin, Germany, Europe, in
world society.
In Hegel's class on philosophy of religion at the University of Berlin sits young Ludwig Feuerbach, who would soon find the secret of
theology in anthropology and announce that it was not God who
created man, but man God. On the 22nd of November 1829, young
Dr. Feuerbach wrote to his old teacher Hegel: "Thousand year old
forms, ways of viewing things must disappear, since the knowledge
of their nullity, vanity, nothingness and finitude has come aboutdespite the fact that this has not yet become completely manifest.
From now on all will become idea and reason. A new ground of things
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must be established, a new history, a second genesis, in which reason
will become the general view of things." Against the master's dialectical logic, Feuerbach argues: "The development of notions in the form
of their generality, in their abstract purity and in their closed up being
in themselves is not now important. Now it is rather necessary to
annihilate and to stamp truly into the ground of truth the previous
world historical views of time, this-worldliness, other-worldliness, ego,
individual, person and particularly of God understood as being outside
of the realm of finitude in the dimension of the absolute." Continuing
his letter against his Lutheran professor's philosophy of religion which
declared Christianity the absolute religion, Feuerbach says, "Christianity cannot, therefore, be considered to be the complete or absolute
religion. The complete and absolute religion can only be the realm of
the reality of the idea and the existing reason. Reason is therefore in
Christianity not yet redeemed." The letter was signed: "Your most
obedient Ludwig Feuerbach, Ph.D." Hegel, by putting into question
and by critiscising all epochs and periods of the social evolution of the
human species, had mobilized his student Feuerbach and had given
him the intellectual instrumentalities to supersede even his own
philosophy. Thus, Feuerbach solved the religious problem for the
radical Hegelian Left until the advent of the contemporary neoMarxist Ernst Bloch's philosophy of the future, of the new history, of
the second genesis, of the "not yet," of real potentiality, of concrete
utopia, of hope, of the new.
Karl Marx, the future father of scientific authoritarian socialism,
came to Berlin from Bonn five years after Hegel's death and attended
the lectures of one of Hegel's students, the rightwing Hegelian Eduard
Gans. But he soon joined the "doctor club" of the leftwing Hegelians.
One year later in 1837, the then 19-year-old Marx wrote to his father:
"I had read fragments of Hegelian philosophy, but I did not much
care for their grotesque, craggy melody. Now I wanted to dive into
the sea again, but with the definite aim of finding intellectual nature
as necessary, concrete and solidly rounded as physical nature; of no
longer practicing skillful faints, but holding the pure pearl up to the
sunlight instead." Marx continues: "I wrote a dialogue of some 24
folios: 'Kleanthe' or 'On the starting point and the necessary progress
of philosophy.' I united to a certain extent art and knowledge, which
had moved apart; and I, a sturdy wanderer, went straight to work attempting a philosophical dialectical development of the Godhead, as
it manifests itself as an idea, as religion, as nature, as history. My final
sentence was the beginning of the Hegelian system and this paper, for
which I did some delving into natural science, Schelling and history,
and which required endless cerebral effort and is written so chaotically ( since it actually meant to be a new logic) that even I can't think
my way back to it-this dearest child of mine, fostered in moonlight,
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carries me like a treacherous siren into the enemy's arms." For a
while, Marx turned to more positive studies. If he had become a positivist, the world would never have had a "Marx" and a Marxism. But
during an illness Marx returned once more "into the enemy's arms."
He re-read Hegel. His critical analysis of Hegel's philosophy began
with the help of Hegel's Logic. It would end decades later with the
application of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and his Logic to
economics, with Das Kapital-the new bible of one-third of mankind.
Hegel had begun, in a peculiar disguise, his march into world history.
Great intellectuals come most alive after they are dead.
Michael Bakunin, the future father of scientific anti-authoritarian
socialism or anarchism, stemmed from a noble family in Russia. In
1835, he broke off his career as an officer in the Russian army, in order
to study philosophy at the University of Moscow. Only twenty-five
years of age, he was considered the most knowledgeable Hegel student
of his country. In 1849 he came to Berlin. Like Kierkegaard, Bakunin
was disappointed in Hegel's former friend and later opponent and successor to his chair of philosophy in Berlin-the nature philosopher
Schelling. So, he joined the Left Wing Hegelians. As a result of his
Berlin studies, he wrote the book: The Reaction in Germany. The
book had to appear anonymously. In this book, Bakunin is much more
radical in his critique of Hegel than his friend Marx. Bakunin admits
that Hegel is without doubt the greatest philosopher of the present,
the highest peak of modern, one-sided theoretical education. Exactly
as this peak, Hegel is also the beginning of the self-dissolution of
modern education. As this peak, Hegel has already transcended theory-of course still in the boundaries of theory-and has postulated
a new practical world, a world which produces itself not through a
formal application and diffusion of fixed theories but through an
original act of practical autonomous spirit. Hegel had shown to
Bakunin, as to Marx but not to Feuerbach, the way from the ethereal
realm of theory to the hard and thorny political practice. The dialectics of philosophical theory and political practice toward a human
realm of freedom will henceforth be the common demand of antiauthoritarian as well as authoritarian socialims on the Hegelian Left.
In 1870, two years before Feuerbach's death and six years before
Bakunin's, Lenin, another Leftwing disciple of Hegel, is born. He
would not only become a rebel on the Hegelian Left, but even a successful revolutionary. The Russian exile Lenin read Hegel in Bern
where the other Russian exile Bakunin, a mere rebel, had died lonely,
estranged from Marx, excommunicated from the communist movement. Enthusiastically, Lenin found from reading Hegel that the truth
is process. He wrote into his notebook in Bern that the dialectical way
of the knowledge of truth leads from living perception to abstract
thought and from there to political practice. This is the way to know!-
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edge of objective reality. E. Kant, according to Lenin's notebook, had
reduced and degraded knowledge in order to make room for faith.
Hegel had exalted knowledge by asserting that all knowledge was
theology. Now the materialist, Lenin triumphantly states, exalts
knowledge about the matter and nature and throws God and the whole
rabble of philosophers, Kant and Hegel included, into the dungpit.
But like everybody else on the Hegelian Left, Lenin does not want
to leave Hegel completely behind. Neither the Old nor the New Left
can do without Hegel. Today neither Marcuse, Fromm, Horkheimer,
Bloch nor even the late Adorno in his Negative Dialectics abandon
Hegel. Under all circumstances, Lenin wants to hold on to what he
considered to be the genial, cardinal idea of the whole Hegelian system: the universal, all-sided, living coherence and connection of everything with everything and the reflection of such connection- materialistically turned around once more-in the notions of man. These
notions in the heads of men must, according to Lenin's notebook, become refined, smooth, dynamic, relative, mutually bound together,
united in their opposition, so that the world can be comprehended
through them. Lenin argues that the continuation of Hegel's and
Marx's work must consist in the further dialectical cultivation, adaptation, arrangements of the history of human thought, of science and
technology. For Lenin, Hegel's Logic became the "Algebra of Revolution," particularly the revolution he initiated in Moscow in 1917.
After a half century of rebellion in civil society, the Hegelian
Left achieved the first successful socialistic revolution in the Russia
of 1917. In reaction to the victory of the Hegelian Left in the Russian revolution, the counter-rebellion of the youth on the Hegelian
Right increased and led to a chain reaction of successful reactionary
fascist counter-revolutions in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany. Revolutions and counter-revolutions have rather lengthy incubation times.
Hitler finally led the Rightwing youth of fascist Europe out to conquer communistic Russia. If he could have won the war, half of Russia would have become a German colony and the other half a crippled
Russian civil society with fascist capitalism and fascist political dictatorship. The Hegelian Left would have been liquidated forever. But
the two opposing factions-the Hegelian Left and the Hegelian Right
(both illegitimate, but nevertheless intellectual sons of the philosopher
and educator Hegel )-met finally in mortal embrace in the bloody
streets of Stalingrad. In this city, the Hegelian Left, with the help of
Hegel's dialectical logic, won a devastating military, moral and political victory over the Hegelian Right which abandoned this logic and
held on to the more conservative content of Hegel's philosophy.
After World War II, Leftwing youth rebellions were numerous in
civil societies around the globe. The New Left in European, American, and Asian universities were inspired by the beginnings of a critical
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theory of societal process in Hegel's philosophy and by the further
continuation of this theory in the not-yet-so-authoritarian, humanisticsocialism of the young Marx and in the anti-authoritarian socialism
of Bakunin. Bakunin's later book, God and the State, was reprinted
in France and Germany during the sixties and influenced the whole
student protest movement of that decade, particularly the May Revolution in Paris in 1968. During the fifties and sixties one country after
the other in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and South America became
or tried to become socialistic and adopt one or the other form of Leftwing Hegelianism. Anarchism remained unsuccessful.
The critical theory of societal process began with Hegel, not with
Marx or Bakunin. Hegel's ruthless criticism of civil society was topped
only by Marx. Anyone comparing Hegel's description of civil society
in his Philosophy of Right with the basic theses on this type of society
by the later Marx will admit that all the fundamental elements of
Marx's critical theory of the societal process of bourgeoise society are
already contained in Hegel's work. Hegel foresaw already, on the
basis of his analysis of the structure of civil society, that this type of
society would never be able to solve the poverty problem. According
to Hegel, the civil society would by its very structure be forced to
transcend its own boundaries and develop colonialistic and imperialistic tendencies. Hegel warned civil society that it must never allow a
huge subproletariat or proletariat to come into existence in its cities.
Since a civil society cannot preserve its equilibrium with a growing,
unemployed proletariat in its cities and is structurally unable to solve
the poverty problem inside itself, and, at the same time, in its search
for cheaper labor, new markets and higher profits, always subsumes
new masses of an external proletariat under its domination, sooner or
later a qualitative jump will take place in world history and the modem epoch will end and a post-modem epoch will come about and the
civil society will be transformed into a new type of society and organic
state in which its contradictions can be dissolved. Despite his criticism
of civil society, Hegel did not become a revolutionary. He knew that
the "Logos" of world history has time and therefore takes his time.
The dialectic of freedom needs time. Hegel became, in terms of the
nee-Kantian, nee-Hegelian, nee-Marxian Frankfurt-School , a more or
less radical reformer or progressive evolutionist. Neither the rebels and
revolutionaries on the Hegelian Left nor the counter-rebels and counter-revolutionaries on the Hegelian Right ever forgave Hegel his radical reformism or progressive evolutionism.

7. The Counter-Rebels
The third group which Hegel witnessed around him in Berlin and
all over Germany consisted of counter-rebels who devoted themselves
to reactionary political activities on the far Right of the political68

ideological spectrum of civil society. Later on, those counter-rebels
would join the extreme Hegelian Right, opposing furiously the Hegelian Left as well as the Hegelian Center in the 19th as well as in the
20th century.
The first visible signs of the counter-rebellious spirit of sections of
German youth were a few reactionary speeches made by Rightwing
students during the otherwise highly liberal if not revolutionary Wartburg Festival of 1817. The aim of the festival was the celebration of
the third centennial of the Reformation. Martin Luther had taken
refuge in Wartburg when he had been persecuted by religious and
political authorities. Another purpose of the festival was to remember
the battle of Leipzig in 1813, in which an allied force of 255,000 men
won a decisive victory over Napoleon and his 160,000 men and forced
him to withdraw behind the Rhine River. Most students participating
in the Wartburg Festival were Lutherans. Many had participated in
the battle of Leipzig.
During the Wartburg Festival counter-rebellious student groups,
motivated by religious and national grounds, not only gave reactionary
speeches but also burned liberal and revolutionary books in public.
The Wartburg Festival was followed in some German cities by pogroms
against the Jews. The student Karl Ludwig Sand assassinated the
writer Kotzebue. The writer had been declared by the Rightwing students to be a Russian spy. The counter-revolutionary youth, therefore,
presumed a perfect right to annihilate Kotzebue as an enemy of the
people. Almost everybody knew that Kotzebue, like many others in
far higher social and political positions, had accepted subsidy-money
from Russia. Such acceptance of subsidy-money from foreign powers
was quite customary in the little-integrated old Europe. Now Kotzebue had to die for taking subsidy money from Russia, because the
German Right-wing youth defined this act as high treason and decreed
his death.
In 1820, the Jewish poet Heinrich Heine, a student of Hegel's, who
later had to leave Germany for exile in France because of his all too
liberal ideas, writes, with his usual irony, of his "admiration" for the
counter-rebellious Rightwing youth of Germany. He had observed
reactionary Rightwing students in a beer cellar in Gottingen. He "admired" the thoroughness with which his "old German friends" prepared the proscription list of their enemies in the ideological Center
and on the ideological Left, so that they could be liquidated when the
counter-revolution succeeded and a new order of things came about.
According to the Rightwing students, whoever descended in the seventh degree from a Frenchman, a Jew or a Slav was to be sentenced
to exile. The most radical counter-rebellious young men had their
headquarters in Heidelberg and particularly in Giessen. They called
themselves the "Blacks." The poet Heine says of the Blacks that they
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could determine exactly the degree of descendance a man or woman
had to have in order to be liquidated when the Rightwing counterrevolution took place. According to Heine, disagreement existed
among the Blacks only concerning the method of execution. Some of
them asserted the sword was the oldest German instrument of execution. But others were somewhat tolerant in their romantic primitivism
and thought the guillotine also could be used as a means of liquidating people from the Left and Center, since it was after all a
German invention.
Hegel, noticing the development of the reactionary Right among
his students, warned in his lectures of those who wanted to revive the
old German mythology in the fashion of romantic primitivism. He
condemned that revival because of its crudeness, its low level of consciousness of freedom, and because the Persians, Greeks and Moslems
had already progressed so much further in their consciousness of freedom than the old German tribesman lying on the banks of the Rhine
and the Danube drinking beer. Hegel warned of cultural and social
regression. Germany would not listen to his warnings. German national socialists would hate him for them. Germany would decide
against Hegel's progressive evolutionism and for the regressive old
German disaster line: from Hegel's competitor at the University of
Berlin-Schopenhauer, through Wagner and Nietzsche to Rosenberg
and Hitler. Seedlike, the reactionary counter-rebellious youth of the
first decades of the 19th century already contained most of the characteristics which later made up the syndrome of 20th century European fascism: romanticism, nationalism, anti-intellectualism, racism,
elitarianism, authoritarianism, sadism and masochism- and beer,
plenty of beer.
The Hegelian Right developed throughout the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. It finally flowed into European fascism.
The Hitler Youth Groups repeated everything reactionary rightwing
students had done a century before. The Right experienced its disaster in Stalingrad. But the catastrophy of the Hegelian Right at
Stalingrad was not as complete as the Hegelian Left might have expected. It is rather symptomatic and symbolic that only a few months
after the end of the Second World War relatively fresh contingents of
the SS Division Hermann Goering, spared in the furious battles in the
East, moved to Strassburg, were transformed into French Foreign
Legionnaires and continued the battle against the Hegelian Left in
Indochina with new tanks and airplanes from the USA. The victory
of the Hegelian Left over the Hegelian Right in Stalingrad would not
have been possible without American military assistance. Now, a few
years after Stalingrad, the Hegelian Right fought against the Hegelian
Left with American weapons. This is the contradiction, the irony and
the tragedy of American foreign policy after the Second World War in
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terms of the continued world-wide struggle between the Hegelian Left
and the Hegelian Right. Only one genuine counter-rebellion of Rightwing youth broke out in the sixties, when rebellious Leftwing youth
came to the climax of its political activity. This happened in the late
sixties in Indonesia. It cost the lives of more than a hundred
thousand so-called "communistic" farmers. It brought Dutch and
American corporations back into Indonesia. President Johnson called
this Indonesian event one of his greatest foreign policy successes. It is
not entirely improbable that the seventies may see more Rightwing
movements and rebellions than the sixties in Western and Eastern
societies.

8. The Evolutionists
Hegel was as little a conformist or traditionalist as he was a rebel
or a revolutionary, a counter-rebel or a counter-revolutionary. As
Marx never wanted to be called a "Marxist," so Hegel would not have
identified himself with the Hegelian Left, Right, or Center. As a more
or less radical reformist, or better still, a progressive evolutionist,
Hegel stands somewhere between the radical Left and the more conservative Center. Because of his progressive-evolutionist orientation,
Hegel showed the greatest interest and paid most personal attention
to the fourth group of students marching around in Berlin and all over
Germany and Europe in the second decade of the great 19th century:
the progressive-evolutionistic student fraternities.
The fraternity brothers had gone through the storm and stress of
the liberation wars against Napoleon. At the time of Hegel's teaching
activity in Berlin, the fraternities were busy in clarifying their still unclear and all too enthusiastic philosophical and political ideas. They
began to mature into men of more or less radical reform, of progressive evolution, rather than violent revolution. Those progressive evolutionists stood left of the center, left of the silent majority of conformists and traditionalists who simply wanted to survive, but also
kept away from the ralical Left which was only too eager to tear down
the whole system of growing civil society together with its feudal residues. The evolutionists in the fraternities wanted to devote themselves to patient, tenacious, hard work toward a slow improvement of
the unjust social conditions in Berlin, Germany, and Europe. Of all
the youth groups in Germany, the fraternities came closest in their
ethos to the inner spirit of freedom in Hegel's philosophy.
Shortly after the Wartburg Festival of 1817, the progressive-evolutionist fraternity students got entangled in a reactionary political whirlpool. The "Karlsbad Resolutions" ordered and sanctioned persecution, witch-hunting, snooping into beliefs and reprisals against
fraternity students and professors allied with them. Metternich had
initiated and the Federal Parliament in Frankfurt had accepted the
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"Karlsbad Resolutions" in reaction to the assassination of the writer
Kotzebue and an assassination attempt against the Hessian Minister
!bell. The "Karlsbad Resolutions" ordered: the liquidation of all
fraternities, censorship for newspapers and all publications under 20
pages, firing of liberal and revolutionary minded professors, police surveillance of the universities, and a central board of inquiry. Professors
were suspended without salary and some were put into prison. The
general effect of the "Karlsbad Resolutions" was the strengthening
of the traditional "law and order" forces in German civil society.
Since the government persecution respected neither students nor
professors, Professor Hegel also felt threatened. In 1821, the Prussian
king banned the nature-philosophy of Oken or similar teachings which
led to atheism. Hegel himself was sometimes charged with pantheism
and even atheism, despite the fact that he continuously confessed to
being a good Lutheran. Even today some theological faculties in
German universities would not consider Hegel's philosophy "Christian," despite the fact that the neo-orthodox Karl Barth thought of
Hegel as the protestant Thomas of Aquinas. Hegel communicated
his worries about the repressive political situation in Prussia to his
old friend Niethammer. "You know," Hegel tells his friend, "I am
on one hand a jittery, anxious man and on the other hand I like my
rest, quiet and calm. It is not exactly comfortable to see thunderstorms moving up the horizon year after year, despite the fact that I
am quite convinced that I will get at most just a few drops of the
rain."
Hegel suffered under the "Karlsbad Resolutions"-the press laws,
the censorship, the measures for police surveillance of the university,
the students and professors. The "Resolutions" were enforced by a
German government which turned more and more to the ideological
and political Right. The youth on the Left considered Hegel's Philosophy of Right servile toward the power-structure and the present order
of domination and therefore conservative if not reactionary. Its publication was delayed for one year by the Rightwing reaction because
it was too liberal for their taste. In this case, the Right was for once
more correct in its judgment than the Left.
In the University of Berlin a sharp conflict arose between the two
great adversaries ( the philosopher Hegel and the theologian Schleiermacher), because of the dismissal of Professor De Wette. (Hegel could
never sympathize with Schleiermacher's definition of religion: "feeling
of dependence." It was too one-sided, romantic, and servile for Hegel's
view of man and religion.) Now the two antagonists met in the political arena. Professors Fries, Oken, and De Wette had lost their chairs
in the Berlin University-Fries and Oken for more philosophical,
De Wette for more political reasons. After the murder of the writer
Kotzebue, De Wette had written a letter of consolation to the mother
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of the culprit Sand, a student of theology, saying the deed had been
committed by a pure, pious youth who had acted to the best of his
belief. De Wette was severely criticized in public for his letter and
had to relinquish his professorship. Hegel and Schleiermacher participated in a secret relief action taken by the "Lawless Society" to which
both the philosopher and theologian belonged. Hegel and Schleiermacher and other professors pledged to pay a yearly income to De
Wette until he found a new job. Hegel gave 25 Thalers, Schleiermacher 50 Thalers. At an evening meeting of the "Lawless Society"
Hegel, in conformity to his Philosophy of Right, defended the right
of the government to dismiss a teacher, in this case De Wette, as long
as it continued paying his salary. Schleiermacher expressed shock at
Hegel's statement and called his attitude toward the D e Wette case
simply mean, piteous, miserable, wretched. H egel's rejoinder was
equally irate. It is very possible tha t Hegel was not only defending
a right of the government, but also disagreeing with De Wette's
judgment concerning the Rightwing assassin Sand. That at least could
be concluded from Hegel's general philosophy and particularly from
his Philosophy of Right and what it has to say about the difference
between individual morality and social science.
Despite his anxieties and extreme carefulness in political matters,
Hegel helped his progressive-evolutionistically minded fraternity stud ents as much as he could. H egel wrote and received letters from
politically persecuted students. He fought for some of those students
with great circumspection and prudence. For instance, he put up 500
Thalers, about a fourth of his yearly salary, as bail for a student's release from prison. Hegel was able to persuade von K amptz, one of
the worst enemies of the contemporary student protest movement in
Berlin to be the lawyer for the progressive-evolutionist student Gustave
Asversus. Hegel interceded with the a uthorities particularly for those
young fraternity students who were politically incrimina ted.
The most important case for which Hegel exerted himself concerned the fate of Friedrich Wilhelm Carove. Carove was a Catholic
fraterni ty student from Koblenz. Tha t was unusual, since most of the
persecuted fraternity students were Protestants. The Catholicism of
the student made no difference to the Lutheran professor Hegel, who
was otherwise quite critical of aspects of spiritual freedom in Catholicism. During the Wartburg Festival of 1817 the fraternity student
Carove had given a great speech. Carove rejected in his speech, very
discreetly and prudently, the racist radicalism of the Rightwinger FolJen and the nationalistic-poet Arndt's somewhat unsound superpatriotism. Ca rove pleaded in his Wartburg speech for the acceptance of foreigners and J ews into the student fraternities . Two years
after the Wartburg Festival, Carove got in trouble with the a uthorities
through the publication of his pamphrlet "About the Murder of
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Kotzebue." Carove's pamphlet was fundamentally concerned, like
Hegel's whole positive-dialectical philosophy, with reconciliation. Freedom and reason were the result of the reconciliation of opposites in
philosophical theory as well as in political practice. But Carove's publication was denounced before the authorities. The highly gifted
Carove was excluded by the authorities from any kind of an academic
career. He was condemned to spend his life in the subordinate position of a second-rate writer. Hegel remained in continual contact with
Carove. Even ten years after his political persecution, Carove wrote
Hegel, addressing his teacher as " My dearest Friend!"
During the 19th and 20th centuries, the progressive evolutionists
again and again came between the firelines of the Hegelian Left and
Right. Today they may be called "fascists" in Russia and "communists" in the USA. Wha tever may h appen to the radical reformists
they can at least be assured that they are closest in their ethos to
Hegel's program: To liberate youth toward an existence of reason
and freedom by facing the negativity of history and by changing the
structure of society by hard detailed social and political work.

9. Hegel today: Beyond Left and Right
The philosopher and educator Hegel was usually silent concerning
the future. He thought that concern with the future consisted only too
often of mere opinions-an all too soft material into which everything
desirable could arbitrarily be impressed. Hegel's main concern was his
present, not his future--our today. But H egel sometimes broke his
silence concerning the future. He did so shortly before his death in his
last lectures on the philosophy of history. In those lectures Hegel
spoke not only of the USA as the probable future of old Europe, but
also of the future of the USA. Wha t Hegel had to say in those lectures may still give at least a hint of guidance to American youth-in
the Center, on the Left as well as on the Right. American youth has
little historical consciousness and therefore is d eeply confused and
sometimes desperate concerning the direction our country has been
taking since the sixties. H egel may show this youth a way beyond the
dualism of Left and Right- rebellion and counter-rebellion, revolution and counter-revolution. He may show them a third way-progressive dialectical evolutionism.
Already in his lectures on the philosophy of art and even more so
in his last lectures on philosophy of history Hegel is highly optimistic
about the future of the US. In national or international crisis situations it is good to know about this optimism of the greatest Western
philosopher of history. Today Arnold Toynbee conditionally affirms
Hegel's optimistic prognoses and does so with much more historical
evidence than was available to H egel. In a recent Life interview even
Mao Tse-tung affirmed Hegel's optimistic proj ection for the USA,
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slightly modifying it, when he said: if Russia will not take the leadership of mankind, the USA will.
As optimistic as Hegel is concerning the future of the USA, he
does not shy away from the grave problems which are obstacles to
the full realization of that future and may even prevent us from ever
reaching it. In Hegel's view world history will reach its freedomtelos. For Hegel that is a matter of inner necessity. No Pavlov or
Skinner can ever hinder, for long, the course of history toward an
era of freedom and dignity. But whether America or Russia will be
the next world historical power, stimulating the highest aspirations
of mankind concerning freedom and dignity, is a matter of insight
and free decision and therefore of achievement as well as of possible
failure and guilt. Whether America will lead mankind to man's home
of identity or will all too soon move into a niche of world history
(like the African tribes, Egypt, Greece or Turkey), leaving unactualized her full evolutionary potential and thereby burying so many
great hopes and aspirations is to a large extent up to the historical and
political initiative of American youth. That is Hegel's message to this
century and to the youth of this country. Marcuse, who wants to lead
American youth into the arena of political action toward a nonrepressive, rational society, is much closer to Hegel than Norman 0.
Brown, who wants to lead American youth out of the rough and tough
political arena into the bloomy fields of symbolism and promises them
social change toward a good and just society without social change.
Hegel had told his students in Heidelberg that Homer once celebrated the triumph of the West over the East: of European measure,
individual beauty, and self-limiting reason over Asiatic splendour (that
is, the magnificence of a patriarchal unity, which either did not
achieve complete differentiation and formation or which disintegrated
into innumerable abstract social units). In Hegel's perspective, a future American Homer will tell in a new American epic the victory
of a living, more universal American reason and freedom over the
highly particularized, imprisoned, not so alive, positive rationality and
freedom of the European nation states. If one wants to think beyond
Europe, Hegel teaches his students, one must think of America. Africa
and Asia have moved into the niche of world history. They may have
a comfortable life, but they will never again come up to the front
of the evolution of the human species toward the ultimate realm of
freedom.
At a time when masses of immigrants were still moving into the
plains of the Mississippi valley, Hegel projected, on the basis of rich
historical data and his dialectical logic, the "not yet," the real potentiality of the USA, which would lead some day to the cultural triumph
of America over Europe. Hegel, carrying in his stomach the sickness
which would finally kill him, told his 60 to 70 students at the Uni-
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versity of Berlin about the "not yet"-the future of the USA: "As to
the political condition of North America the general object of the
existence of this state is not yet fixed and determined, and the necessity for the firm combination does not yet exist; for a real state and a
real government arises only after a distinction of classes has arisen,
when wealth and poverty become extreme, and when such a condition of things presents itself, that a large portion of the people cannot
any longer satisfy its necessities in a way in which it has been accustomed so to do." "But America," Hegel lectures his students, "is
hitherto exempt from this pressure, for it has the outlet of colonization constantly and widely open ... by this means the chief source of
discontent is removed, and the continuation of the existing civil conditions is guaranteed. Had the woods of Germany still been in existence," Hegel asserts, "the French Revolution would not have occurred.
North America will be comparable with Europe only after the immeasurable space, which that country presents to its inhabitants, shall
have been occupied, and the members of the political body shall
have begun to be pressed back upon each other. Only when the
direct increase of agriculturists is checked," Hegel predicts, "will the
inhabitants, instead of pressing outward to occupy the fields, press inward upon each other, pursuing city occupations, and trading with
their fellow citizens; and so form a compact system of civil society,
and require an organized state." Hegel prophesizes: "America is
therefore the land of the future, where in ages that lie before us,
the burden of the world history shall reveal itself-perhaps in a contest between North and South America."
Hegel's prognosis and program for the future social evolution of
America is quite clear: First evolutionary stage: the development of
farms and villages and small towns; Second evolutionary stage: development of civil society with big cities, based on production and
exchange; Third evolutionary stage: development of an organized
organic state-which for Hegel is nothing more or less than society
organized rationally, freely and justly in terms of internal and external
public law; Fourth evolutionary stage: possible development of a rational and free continental state, embracing North and South America.
American youth stands before the task of developing the real government, the real rational and free organic supernational or continental
state. Hegel has by far not already happened.
The philosopher Hegel's greatest pedagogical achievement was giving the youth of the following generations a model of the course of
world history by which it could orient itself in time, and encouraging
this youth to face the harshness of historical reality and endure the
always wholly "other" in the strangeness of social objectivity as well
as in the hard, always resisting political conditions. Hegel knew that
the highest and most delicate task of the true educator was not to
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draw young people to himself and bind them to himself, but to lead
them away from himself. The good teacher is the one who makes
himself superfluous precisely by his teaching. Young people become
capable of freedom, happy to be free and willing to educate themselves toward a rational and free existence under the experience of
the wholly "other," which never bends to all desires, to wishful thinking of the ego, entangled in narcissism. To students, who tried to find
heaven for themselves alone, Hegel presented the gigantic process of
world history in a huge cosmos, which has no regard whatsoever for
individual human beings. Hegel continually warns of and fights
against the romantic disease which pollutes the minds of youth. The
romantic disease drove European youth into the facist movement.
Romantic primitivism is the most dangerous virus in the minds of many
contemporary young men and women in our positive universities.
Hegel promoted general education toward social and historical objectivity; toward the development of an intellectual energy, able to
break narrow willfullness, to oppose bad romantic subjectivity unmediated by objective reality of cosmos or history, to liberate toward
reason and freedom. Such general education ( conceived of as liberation toward reason and freedom) is the most difficult business on earth.
Can the philosopher and educator Hegel help American youth
overcome romantic subjectivity and liberate itself toward a rational
and free existence? Can he help them in the dramatic social development from civil society to the real non-repressive supra-national or
even continental state? To lead Hegel and American youth into a new
and honest encounter would be very worthwhile and necessary, but
difficult. This new encounter would presuppose the sucess of an even
more difficult task. This would be to let American youth take root
in that healthy confidence, which Hegel characterized as threefold:
1) confidence is science, 2 ) faith in reason, 3) confidence and faith
in one's self. Only such rational, reason-related and society-related
self confidence can provide a powerful impulse and motive-to
give Hegel the word a last time-to that intellectual "rejuvenation,
which shows its next effect and expression in the political reality."
Such intellectual rejuvenation may lead to a social and political movement of youth, which is able to go beyond the rebellious and revolutionary Left and the counter-rebellious and counter-revolutionary
Right in terms of a progressive social evolution toward a rational
society and state powerful enough to be able to afford freedom, not
only for one or a few, but for all in practice as well as in theory.
Such intellectual rejuvenation may very well begin and be promoted
in the dimension of general education in our positive universities.
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Thoughts About a
General Studies Program
0LLIN

J.

DRENNAN

One of the often repeated goals of a program of general or liberal
education is that of promoting an awareness of the meaning of being
human. The following thoughts were stimulated by the question
"What does it mean to be human?" They represent an exploratory,
not a definitive, statement. If they excite a response, they will have
served the purpose for which they were placed on paper.

*

*

*

*

*

*

Dogs bark and trout jump, and it seems that neither dogs nor trout
bark or jump because they are aware of the need to ba rk a nd jump
and thus will the actions. It is presumed that they bark and jump
because it is the nature of dogs and trout to do so. They may develop
a consciousness of their actions, but it is severely limited. Human beings, as far as we know, are the only living things that have the capability to become increasingly conscious of their actions; to become
aware of themselves self-consciously and to plan deliberate, complex
actions such as speaking. Human beings do much of what they do
merely because it is their nature to do so without becoming aware of
their actions. They behave in their early life in ways tha t lead to
inferences by observers about their perspectives but they may be essentially unaware of those perspectives. Their actions have an unconscious, unpremeditated air about them which seems to deny their own
awareness of those actions. But because of the very capability within
each human being for awareness-the potential for awareness may be
one definition of humanness-normal human beings experience a time
in their lives when they seem to awaken to themselves and to their
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surroundings. This is the time of adolescence and does not last for
just an instant but may extend over weeks, months, or years.
Each individual has within himself a potential for the development
of characteristics that cannot be realized unconsciously. The potential
must be perceived by the individual and its development must be
deliberately fashioned. This can only follow the individual's "awakening" to awareness. The "humanness" of the individual human being
is a measure of the degree that he has consciously become more than
he would have become without the "awakening."
Because of the innate potential of the human being, the process
of becoming "human" begins for almost every individual at some point
in the course of his growing older. Whether or not every individual
will inevitably "awaken" without some external assistance is a vital
question for the planning of a general education program. It may be
that the awakening happens whether or not the individual attends
school. It may happen whether or not the individual is formally
"educated." The process begins; how far it advances depends on the
particular circumstances surrounding each individual human being.
Education, in general, and general education, in particular, enters
the process of "humanizing" each individual as a vehicle to promote
and broaden the growing awareness that follows the "awakening."
General Studies does not cause this growth; it can only augment and
sustain it once it has begun. For most, if not all, students entering a
general education program, the process has begun. Freshmen, entering a University in their late teens, have experienced their "awakening" and have already begun the process of reorienting their conceptions of their lives and their worlds.
Thus a General Studies program can become a means of concentrating upon this newly perceived, self-conscious feeling of relation to
self, others and the surroundings. A part of the responsibility of general education is that of suggesting by precept and by action, ways of
perceiving this relationship in a variety of contexts. Perception and
meaning are reciprocal facets of awareness, and personal meaning is
enhanced as perceptions from alternative viewpoints or perspectives
are explored. Particularly the General Studies program should not,
by its structure or its instruction, act to "turn off'' or to "shut down"
awareness for individuals as they pursue the program.
A part of the responsibility of General Studies is to pass beyond the
exploration of perceptions to the consideration of behavioral responses
to the perceptions. Behavior and choices of behavior have consequences that are perceived and choices of behavior are made in anticipation of the reactions that may come in response to the chosen behavior. Perhaps the most important end result of an educational program is the correspondence achieved between the perception of a situation, the conscious and deliberate behavioral response to the percep-
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tion, and the succeeding perceptions of the consequences of the behavioral response. The higher the degree of correspondence between
the anticipated perception and the actual perception the more successful the educational program.
Personal goals and values are involved in the choice of behavior,
and when the choice of them is seen as providing guidance for a
realistic correspondence between perceived circumstances and consequences of action, the individual is far along the road to achieving
''humanness."
The initial task of a General Studies program, then, is one of making the nature of the individual "awakening" explicit to individuals
who have just recently arrived to their own personal self-awareness.
Their awareness is felt, sensed, appreciated, feared and to some extent
understood. The intellectual study of it has most often been absent.
Thus feelings are to be verbalized to the extent that it is possible to do
so and terms, concepts and abstractions are supplied to allow sufficient
understanding to be achieved so that forms of behavior in response to
self-awareness can become more deliberate and planned.
At that point in the program the nature of behaviors, reasons for
them and their consequences can be considered meaningfully. This
will involve a constantly broadening consideration of circumstances
and their relationship to the individual students. Much of what has
been traditionally considered the backbone of a liberal educa tion will
become significant as it is fitted into a developing framework of meaning as the subject "What does it mean to be human?" is pursued
farther and farther and deeper and deeper. As the study progresses
it will become necessary to introduce a gradually increasing complexity
in conceptual patterns. It will be necessary to extend the ways in
which consequences are assigned and evaluated. And it will be necessary to refine conceptions of behavior so that subtle responses to
circumstances can be devised and enacted.
The degree of abstraction and conceptualization envisioned above
seems consistent with the traditional thrust of a liberal education. Is
it possible that it is unrealistic in the nineteen seventies to expect all
students who attend colleges and universities to engage successfully in
this degree of abstraction? Is it possible that present heterogeneity of
student bodies demands a broader and less taxing conception of the
end results of general education? How these questions are answered
will determine in great measure the nature of any particular general
education program. A further question would seem to be necessa ry:
With rapid change making tradition less and less effective in providing
satisfactory guides for action, can any less be tolerated as an end result
of education?
The end result of the entire process is persons who perceive their
world to an appropriate degree of complexity and from a variety of
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perspectives sufficiently large to allow their conscious response to that
world to bring a personally satisfying degree of success. This success
in the end is measured by how closely the behaviors acted out result
in consequences that were desired and anticipated in terms of the perception of the circumstances.
Thus the General Studies program should have a structure that begins with a consideration of the maturation process of growing selfawareness: including psychological, physiological, philosophical and
physical aspects of the process. This initial study should be followed
by a gradual expansion of the conditions and circumstances that enter
into the self-awareness. The process should be considered incomplete
until that self-awareness has been expanded to include at least the
following aspects that affect an individual's behaviors:

1. the historical antecedents of the present and the flow of time
into the future
2. the physical and social environmental factors that limit and
prescribe aspects of behavior
3. the nature of resources within individuals for creating personally satisfying periods of non-vocationally occupied time. [Perhaps this can be construed to include the development of
personal appreciation of a variety of activities that might serve
to supply aesthetic, physical and emotional enjoyment and
satisfaction during recreational and leisure time periods.]
A General Studies program should be a student-centered program;
centered around a deep and enduring sensitivity to the individual
nature of the learning process and the impact of the total program
on individual students.
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